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This paper proposes an effective approach for modelling and assessing the risks associated with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
integrated into national airspace system (NAS). Two critical hazards with UAV operations are considered and analyzed, which are
ground impacts and midair collisions. Threats to fatalities that result from the two hazards are the focus in the proposed method.
In order to realize ground impact assessment, a multifactor risk model is designed by calculating system reliability required to meet
a target level of safety for different UAV categories. Both fixed-wing and rotary-wing UAVs are taken into account under a real
scenario that is further partitioned into different zones to make the evaluation more precise. Official territory and population data
of the operation scenario are incorporated, as well as UAV self-properties. Casualty area of impacting debris can be obtained as well
as the probability of fatal injuries on the ground. Sheltering factors are not neglected and defined as four types based on the real
scenario. When midair collision fatality risk is estimated, a model of aircraft collisions based on the density of civil flight in different
regions over Chinese airspace is proposed. In the model, a relative collision area and flying speed between UAVs and manned aircraft
are constructed to calculate expected frequency of fatalities for each province correspondingly. Truthful data with different numbers
of UAVs is incorporated in the model with the expected number of fatalities after a collision is included. Experimental simulations
are made to evaluate the ground impacts and midair collisions when UAVs operate in the NAS.

1. Introduction
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are a kind of aircraft
without pilots onboard but can be remotely controlled or
can fly autonomously based on preprogrammed flight plans
[1, 2], which is a viable and operational technology in the
future [3, 4]. UAVs are one of the fastest growing aviation
sectors. Due to their capabilities to work remotely and under
extremely hazardous environments [5, 6], the UAVs could
accomplish a wide variety of missions ranging from military
reconnaissance to environmental monitoring [7, 8].
The integration of UAVs into the NAS presents a number of challenges currently addressed by Federal Aviation

Administration (FAA) in the context of the operational safety
implications [9]. Like all technologies, there are two primary
risks associated with their applications [10]. One is the impact
with people or structures situated on the ground when UAVs
crashed. The other is the collisions with other aircraft in the
air.
Until now UAVs have to be operated in a segregated airspace based on FAA regulation. That is because
there are inherent safety concerns with UAVs due to the lack
of onboard human pilots [11]. Since a final rulemaking has not
yet been completed, FAA only approves UAVs’ access to the
national airspace on a case-by-case basis [12]. FAA provides
this approval through three different means, public or civil
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Figure 1: Problem description of ground impact assessment.

certificates of waiver or authorization (COA), Section 333
exemptions, and special airworthiness certificates in the
experimental category and the restricted category [13]. One
of the important steps in obtaining the approval is a proof
that the UAS operations can be conducted at an acceptable
level of safety [14, 15].
Risk assessments and estimations of UAVs operating
in the NAS become the basement and the first key step.
Because it will fundamentally transform existing aviation
patterns and its public perceptions. In the past few years,
many methods have been proposed to realize the assessments
and estimations. Anno [16] investigated midair collision risk
using a random collision theory and compared the results
with historic collision data from 1969 to 1978. McGeer [17, 18]
did hazard estimation research on the Aerosonde UAS. In the
existing research, uniform traffic densities were incorporated.
Two different constant densities were used for UAVs themselves and the background traffic. A study on both midair
collisions and ground impacts based on the collision model
of gas molecules was proposed by Lum and Waggoner [19].
Also in Lum’s another paper [20], actual UAVs’ trajectories
for a ground impact analysis and a realistic distribution
of average glide angle were used to refine the expected
values of ground fatalities. A comprehensive system-wide
study presented by Weibel and Hansman [21] used a ratio
of the volume swept by the background aircraft to the total
airspace volume. In his other related work [22], conditional
probabilities were included to develop a separation standard
model using the uncorrelated encounter model [23]. HakTae Lee [11] proposed a distributed traffic model with actual
traffic data, which was collected over a one-year period to
enable a probabilistic approach for risk assessments. Sheridan
[24] proposed a model to estimate the relative collision
probability between any two aircraft at the closest point of
their approaches based on Gaussian density functions.
The main contribution of the work is that an effective
approach for modelling and assessing the risks associated
with UAVs integrated into NAS is proposed. Two critical
hazards of UAV operations are taken into account, namely,
ground impacts and midair collisions. The corresponding
hazard analysis is conducted and we focus on threats to
fatalities generated by the two hazards. A ground impact

assessment model is proposed considering system reliability required to meet a target level of safety for different
UAVs. Both fixed-wing and rotary-wing UAVs are taken into
account under a real scenario, which is further partitioned
into different zones to make the evaluation more precise.
In the model, territory and population data, casualty areas,
and sheltering factors are all indispensable. To estimate the
midair collision fatality risk, a model of aircraft collisions
based on density of civil flight in different regions over China
is proposed. A relative collision area and operating speed
between UAVs and manned aircraft are constructed to obtain
expected frequency of fatalities for each province using
official government data with different numbers of UAVs.
Experimental simulations are made to evaluate the ground
impacts and midair collisions when UAVs operate in the NAS.
The models in this paper provide a generic framework that
can be used to structure the development of safety cases for
any UAV operation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Ground impact assessment, including problem description,
model establishment, and result analysis, is provided in
Section 2. Section 3 describes the midair collision risk estimation models and the final simulation verifications. The
paper is concluded in Section 4.

2. Ground Impact Assessment
A model of ground impact assessment for UAVs was proposed to investigate the influence of different factors on
the equivalent level of safety (ELOS) in terms of ground
fatalities per hour of UAV system operations. The model
incorporated total system reliability, UAV size and kinetic
energy, and population characteristics and probabilities of
fatality in different vicinity of operation.
2.1. Problem Description. Once a failure occurs on the UAVs,
there will be uncontrolled ground impacts. It is assumed
that there will be a number of fatalities on the ground once
ground impact events take place, which are further defined as
hazardous events [25] by FAA criteria [26]. There are many
factors that should be taken into account, which is shown
in Figure 1. The first is the properties of UAVs themselves,
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including the probability of failure and the casualty area
on the ground. The other are ground features where UAVs
crashed. Population density and probability of fatality are also
included.
Probability of failure means whether a hazardous event
will happen. It could be used to evaluate the frequencies that
a UAV malfunctions. When the casualty area is calculated,
dimension of UAVs, maximum flying height and velocity, and
maximum takeoff mass (MTOM) are incorporated based on
the UAV themselves. Casualty area is also strongly affected by
glide angle for different UAVs. Combining with the population density, the average height and radius of a human body
on the ground could also influence the final assessments. The
probability of fatality is highly related to the sheltering factors
considering different types of crash areas. Higher sheltering
factors will lead to lower probability of fatality.

Casualty Area

RUAV
rP

(rP +RUAV )

Figure 2: Vertical impact analysis.

2.2. Model Analysis
(1) Ground Impact Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS). The
safety level of UAVs that operate in national airspace system
(NAS) is usually measured by fatality rate that is given as
ground fatalities per hour of operations of the UAVs. For
manned aircraft the fatality rates based on NTSB data for the
period from 1983 to 2006 are in the order of 10−8 , although it
does not include fatalities after emergency landings, ditching,
and other situations. The equivalent level of safety (ELOS) is
closer to 10−7 if the latter are included [27]. Usually the ELOS
for UAVs used for the ground impact analysis is set an order of
magnitude beyond that required for manned aircraft systems.
UAVs will not be accepted by the public unless it is safer than
manned aircraft. In this paper 10−8 is set for ground impact
assessment of UAVs, which exceeds the current level of safety
of manned aircraft operations [21].
(2) Probability of Failure. Probability of failure for UAVs
means whether a hazardous event will happen. It is highly
related to the safe operating time in the NAS. Longer safe
operating time means lower failure probability. Different
UAVs will have different failure probabilities. Obviously
failure probability is derived from the inverse of the time
between two consecutive failures [21]. All general types that
could result in ground impact are considered as failures,
which includes failures of any components on the UAV
system or human errors. Suppose the failure probability
of UAV is denoted as 𝑃 and tF is the time between two
consecutive failures, the following equation could then be
obtained:
1
𝑃=
(1)
𝑡𝐹
(3) Casualty Area of UAV Debris. There are two kinds of
impacts on the ground when a UAV crashes. One is vertical
impact and the other is horizontal impact. We will illustrate
the casualty areas for these two kinds of impacts, respectively.
The casualty area of a vertically falling piece of debris is a
circle whose radius is the sum of the radius of a circle with
area equal to the largest cross sectional area of the piece

hP
a

d

rP
RUAV

Figure 3: Horizontal impact analysis.

and the radius of a human being [28]. As given in Figure 2,
rP is the average radius of human body and RUAV is the
maximum radius of UAV dimension. Then the casualty area
of a vertically falling UAV debris could be calculated with the
following equation:
𝐴 𝐶 = 𝜋 (𝑟𝑃 + 𝑅𝑈𝐴𝑉 )

2

(2)

The basic horizontal casualty area is illustrated in
Figure 3. Note that d is horizontal distance that UAV debris
travels as it falls the height of a person and the impact angle
is an angle that the velocity vector makes with the horizontal
plane or surface impacted [28]. HP is the average height of
standing human bodies. Based on the illustrations in Figure 3,
horizontal casualty area can then be obtained by using
2

𝐴 𝐶 = 2 ⋅ (𝑟𝑃 + 𝑅𝑈𝐴𝑉 ) ⋅ 𝑑 + 𝜋 ⋅ (𝑟𝑃 + 𝑅𝑈𝐴𝑉 )

(3)

In (3) d is the horizontal distance that is calculated using
(4). In (4), 𝛾 is the approaching angle of UAVs, which is
derived from their corresponding features.
𝑑=

𝐻𝑝
tan (𝛾)

(4)
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Figure 4: Velocity determination for fixed-wing UAVs.

Figure 5: Velocity determination for rotary-wing UAVs.

(4) Probability of Fatal Injuries. It is known that human body
is able to sustain a certain level of force or injury. In this
way, the presence of a person in an area affected by a ground
impact cannot guarantee a fatality. Moreover, obstacles on
the ground such as buildings and trees may provide shelters,
which will correspondingly increase the chances of survival.
In order to describe the probability of fatality of a person
exposed to a UAV crash on the ground more accurately, the
human vulnerability and sheltering effects are indispensable
in the proposed model. It is evident that both the two
aforementioned factors should be taken into account. This
model is provided by the following equation [27]:
𝑃𝑓 =

1−𝑘
1 − 2𝑘 + √𝛼/𝛽 ⋅ [𝛽/𝐸𝐶 ]

3/𝑃𝑆

(5)

Probability of fatality Pf can be calculated by using (5).
In (5), PS stands for the sheltering factor, whose value is
selected from zero to infinity. Because it is rescaled, so that its
average value matches closer the Feinstein average lethality
curve. The 𝛼 parameter is the impact energy required for a
fatality probability of 50% for human beings when 𝑃𝑆 = 6.
The 𝛽 parameter is the impact energy threshold required to
cause a fatality for a person, which can be considered to be
a constant with value 34 J [29]. EC is the kinetic energy of
crashed UAVs at the impact point, which is determined by
their own masses and velocities. Another k is a correction
factor that is used to improve the estimations given for
low kinetic energies, especially those close to, or below the
threshold limit of 34 J. It can be further obtained by (6). The
objective is to maximize the robustness while satisfying some
desired mission requirements. Especially in (5), sensitivity
and robustness analysis are performed by changing different
values of a, k, and 𝑃𝑠 , which is associated with the task
and environmental complexities on value and risk models
demonstrated the robustness and reliability of these models.
𝑘 = min [1, (

𝛽 3/𝑃𝑆
) ]
𝐸𝐶

(6)

Vfalling from hMAX is set as equal as the freefall velocity from
the maximum flying height [30]. Vmax op is the maximum
operation velocity which is determined by UAV itself.
For rotary UAVs, the impact velocity is obtained with
another way as shown in Figure 5. 𝑉𝑜𝑥 is the maximum
operation velocity and 𝑉𝑦 is the freefall velocity from the
maximum flying height. In this way, (8) can be formulated.
2 + 𝑉2
𝑉𝑖𝑚𝑝 = √𝑉𝑜𝑥
𝑦

(8)

There is no doubt that 𝑉𝑦 can be calculated using the
equation Vy = 𝑔∙𝑡. Combining Figure 5 and (8) the following
equation can be used to calculate the approaching angle 𝛾:
𝛾 = arctan

𝑉𝑦
𝑉𝑜𝑥

(9)

When the velocities of all kinds of UAVs at the crashing
point are obtained, the corresponding kinetic energy could
be then determined as given in the equation below as well as
the maximum takeoff mass (MTOM):
𝐸𝐶 =

1
2
⋅ 𝑀 ⋅ 𝑉𝑖𝑚𝑝
2

(10)

Once all the factors are taken into account, the ground
risk assessment model could be completed using
𝑁 = 𝑃 ⋅ 𝐴 𝐶 ⋅ 𝐷𝑃 ⋅ 𝑃𝑓

(11)

N is the number of on ground victims per flight hour as
well as ground fatalities, which should satisfy the safety level
given by FAA. Based on the analysis above, its value in this
paper is set as 10−8 . DP is the population density where the
UAVs operate. In this way, by using (11), failure probability
for UAVs can be determined. Further, the time between two
consecutive failures tF could be obtained with (1) for each
UAV operating in the NAS.
2.3. Model Simulations

(5) Kinetic Energy Estimation at Impact. In this paper two
kinds of UAVs are taken into account, one is fixed-wing and
the other is rotary-wing. Once the velocity at the crash point
is calculated, the kinetic energy can then be obtained. The key
problem is how to calculate the velocity accurately.
Figure 4 gives the velocity determination for fixed-wing
UAVs. hmax is the maximum flying height. The glide angle
or the approaching angle 𝛾 is set as 45∘ [30]. In this way, the
velocity at the crashing point can be calculated with [30]
𝑉𝑖𝑚𝑝 = max {1.4 ⋅ 𝑉max 𝑜𝑝, 𝑉𝑓𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 ℎ𝑀𝐴𝑋 }

(7)

2.3.1. Simulation Scenario. The scenario considered in this
paper is a real case, which is Changqing Campus, Shandong
Jiaotong University, Jinan, China. The flying area is shown in
Figure 6, where three circles are drawn. The green circle is the
operation area with radius 200 meters, the yellow one is the
buffer area with radius 350 meters, and the adjacent area with
radius 450 meters is in red color. All the flight operations took
place in the operation area, namely, in the green circle.
The Changqing Campus is characterized by different
population densities and offers different kinds of shelters
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Table 2: Percentage of different types of areas and central angles.
Zone
No.

Buildings

Trees

Sparse
Tree

No
Obstacles

Central
Angle

17.32%
0
27.27%
0
11.14%
0

21.37%
58.32%
49.69%
41.95%
46.45%
7.69%

23.74%
32.39%
5.81%
21.10%
6.68%
62.03%

37.57%
9.29%
17.23%
36.95%
35.73%
30.28%

78.0∘
26.2∘
88.7∘
23.6∘
87.0∘
56.5∘

Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6

Figure 6: Simulation scenario.
Table 1: Different sheltering factors in different areas.
Type No.
Type 1
Type 2
Type 3
Type 4

Area
Reinforced concrete buildings
Trees
Sparse trees
Area without obstacles

Sheltering factor
40
20
10
0

for people on the ground. In the proposed model, four
types of shelters are defined, namely, reinforced concrete
buildings, trees, sparse trees, and areas without obstacles.
The reinforced concrete buildings could offer high population
density but as well as high values of sheltering factor. The
others are characterized by low population densities and
sparse trees can only be able to offer poor sheltering effects.
The sheltering factor is an absolute real number as mentioned
before. It is evaluated according to a qualitative estimation
of the operative scenario. Different sheltering factors [31] for
different types of areas in the proposed model can be found
in Table 1.
Suppose the total area where UAVs operate is S; the
separate areas of reinforced concrete buildings, trees, sparse
trees, and without obstacles are denoted as S1 , S2 , S3 , and S4 ,
with their own sheltering factor P1S , 𝑃𝑆2 , P3S , and P4S . We can
easily find that 𝑆 = 𝑆1 + 𝑆2 + 𝑆3 + 𝑆4 . In this way, overall
sheltering factor of the operation area can be calculated using
following equation:
𝑃𝑆 = 𝑃𝑆1 ×

𝑆1
𝑆
𝑆
𝑆
+ 𝑃𝑆2 × 2 + 𝑃𝑆3 × 3 + 𝑃𝑆4 × 4
𝑆
𝑆
𝑆
𝑆

(12)

In order to evaluate the average population density and
sheltering factor accurately, the area has been partitioned into
six separate flying zones, which is shown in Figure 7. In each
zone, the percentage of different types of areas and central
angles of the six zones are different based on the real scenario
case. The partition in detail can be found in Table 2.
Combining with Figure 7, we can find that the six
zones are determined by their corresponding central angles,
whose units are degree. From Table 2, there are no concrete

Figure 7: Partition of the flight area.

Table 3: Distribution of population in different zones.
Zone No.
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6

Central Angle
78
26.2
88.7
23.6
87
56.5

Population
10534
395
7901
395
5267
1843

Percentage
40%
1.5%
30%
1.5%
20%
7%

buildings in Zone 2, Zone 4, and Zone 6, which means the
sheltering effects are very weak. Correspondingly, the density
of population in these flying zones will be low.
Another scenario parameter that should be paid attention
to is the density of population in each zone. Based on the
official data from the school website, the total number of
people in Changqing Campus, Shandong Jiaotong University,
is 26335. The mathematical statistics is used to find out how
many people are there in different zones at a special time
during the workday and the distribution of all the population
is analyzed. Table 3 gives the distribution of all the people in
different operation zones. From the table, we find that most
people are in Zone 1 during the daytime, namely, as high as
40%. The number of people in Zone 3 is smaller than that
in Zone 1. That is because dormitories and canteens locate
in Zone 3. There are outdoor field and school gymnasium in
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Rotary

Length
(mm)

MTOM
(kg)

Firebird

1200

830

1.2

X8

2120

820

4.2

Typhoon H

457

520

1.98

Zenith ATX8

600

600

9.65

Speed
83 km/h
110
km/h
48.6
km/h
72 km/h

20

0.35

18

0.30

16

0.25

14

0.20

12
10

0.15

8

0.10

6

0.05

Zone 5. The percentage of the three zones could arrive at 90%.
The other zones are mainly trees, hills, and a lake.
2.3.2. UAV Parameter Settings. The ground impact model of
(11) was applied to two types of UAVs, one is fixed-wing and
the other is rotary-wing. Four kinds of UAVs from three
different manufacturers are considered in the experiments.
A summary of parameters of the used UAVs are shown in
Table 4. All the data is from the official manual. Firebird and
Typhoon H are produced by Yuneec. X8 and Zenith ATX8 are
from Airelectronics and Aerialtronics, respectively.
Firebird and X8 are two fixed-wing aircraft with similar
length. But X8 is larger than Firebird with wider wingspan,
as well as heavier maximum takeoff mass. X8 could fly at
110 km/h, which is much faster than Firebird at 83 km/h.
Typhoon H and Zenith ATX8 belong to rotary-wing UAVs,
which are much smaller than fixed-wing UAVs. Their
wingspans are 457 mm and 600 mm, respectively. The two
also have similar length as 520 mm and 600 mm. However,
the maximum takeoff mass of Zenith ATX8 is much heavier
than that of Typhoon H as 9.65 kg and 1.98 kg, respectively.
The flying speed of Zenith ATX8 is 20 m/s, which is faster
than that of Typhoon H with 13.5 m/s.
Another parameter is the flying height of UAVs in the
operation airspace. Considering the performances of the four
UAVs in Table 4, it is illegal to fly above 120 m in China
based on a new regulation published in January 2018. For
the baseline case, the maximum height is set at 120 m in the
proposed model, which means all the UAVs will fall from the
height of 120 m.
The average height and radius of human beings on the
ground that is needed in (3) and (4), namely, HP and RP , are
set as 1.8 m and 0.25 m, respectively, during the experiments.
The sliding angle 𝛾 for fixed-wing UAVs is to be seen constant
as the same as 45∘ .
2.3.3. Result Analysis
(1) Fatality and Sheltering Factors in Different Zones. Figure 8
shows the probability of fatality when the four kinds of UAVs
fly in six different operation airspace in Changqing Campus,
Shandong Jiaotong University. There is no doubt that it is
more fatal in Zone 6 and Zone 4 compared with other four
zones. That is because in Zone 6 30.28% is bare and 62.03% is
covered by sparse tress. The sheltering effect is very low in this
zone. In Zone 4, 36.95% is bare and there is a hill in this field.
Also 21.10% of this zone are sparse tress. Zone 3 is the safest

Sheltering Factor

Fixed

Wingspan
(mm)

Model

Probability of Fatality

Type

22

0.40

Table 4: UAV parameters for ground impact analysis.

Zone 1

Zone 2

Zone 3

Zone 4

Zone 5

Zone 6

4

Different Flying Zones
Firebird
X8
Typhoon H

Zenith ATX8
Sheltering Factor

Figure 8: Probability of fatality and sheltering factor in different
flying zones.

Table 5: Parameters in different zones.
Zone 1
Ratio 21.67%
0.0764
DP
13.577
Ps

Zone 2
7.28%
0.0085
14.903

Zone 3
24.64%
0.0504
21.428

Zone 4
6.56%
0.0095
10.501

Zone 5
24.17%
0.0343
14.413

Zone 6
15.69%
0.0185
7.741

because there are a lot of trees and buildings, which make the
sheltering factor high. The total percentage of the two types
could arrive 76.96%. Zone 1 and Zone 2 are similar as given
in Figure 8.
From the histograms in the figure, Firebird is the most
fatal compared with the other three no matter where it
operates. Typhoon H is a little better than Firebird. Zenith
ATX8 is the safest of the four. Actually, the differences
between Firebird and Typhoon H are not huge at all which
are given in Figure 8.
Figure 8 also shows the sheltering factors in different
flying zones. Zone 3 could provide the best protection for the
people on the ground with the highest sheltering factor, which
is because 76.96% of this zone are buildings and trees. Zone 6
is the most dangerous with the lowest sheltering factor, which
is led by bare ground and a lake. Different simulation results
as given in Figure 8 are presented to show the robustness of
the proposed model.
(2) Ground Impacts for UAVs in Different Flying Zones. Based
on the parameters given in the previous part, four different
UAVs operate in the six operation airspace. Then combining
with (11), the failure probability for each kind of UAV can be
calculated. The results are given in Table 5.
Table 5 shows the area proportions, density of population,
and sheltering factors of different zones. Zone 3, Zone 5, and
Zone 1 are the three biggest areas with the percentage of
24.64%, 24.17%, and 21.67%, which are student dormitories,
teaching buildings, and sports field. Correspondingly, the
density of population in Zone 1 is the highest and then is
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Table 6: Results for Firebird.
Firebird
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6

EC

AC

1411.2

11.83

Pf
0.19
0.17
0.11
0.26
0.18
0.37

P
5.82E-08
5.82E-07
1.50E-07
3.45E-07
1.39E-07
1.23E-07

1/P
1.72E+07
1.72E+06
6.67E+06
2.90E+06
7.18E+06
8.14E+06

Table 7: Results for X8.
X8
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6

EC

AC

4939.2

26.18

Pf
0.15
0.13
0.08
0.22
0.14
0.35

P
3.26E-08
3.32E-07
9.07E-08
1.82E-07
7.89E-08
5.95E-08

1/P
3.07E+07
3.01E+06
1.10E+07
5.50E+06
1.27E+07
1.68E+07

Table 8: Results for Typhoon H.
Typhoon H
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6

EC

AC

2508.9

2.63

Pf
0.17
0.15
0.10
0.24
0.16
0.36

P
2.87E-07
2.90E-06
7.67E-07
1.66E-06
6.92E-07
5.69E-07

1/P
3.48E+06
3.45E+05
1.30E+06
6.03E+05
1.45E+06
1.76E+06

Table 9: Results for Zenith ATX8.
ATX8
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Zone 6

EC

AC

13278.4

3.53

Pf
0.13
0.11
0.07
0.19
0.12
0.33

P
2.91E-07
3.01E-06
8.63E-07
1.55E-06
7.12E-07
4.69E-07

1/P
3.44E+06
3.32E+05
1.16E+06
6.47E+05
1.40E+06
2.13E+06

Zone 3 with the values 0.0764 and 0.0504, respectively. The
third is the sports field. It means most of the population
will be in the classrooms or dormitories, which is a true
situation in Chinese universities. Also in Zone 3 most of
this area is concrete buildings as high as 27.27%, which
makes its sheltering factor as high as 21.428 that is shown in
Table 5. It is similar for Zone 5 and Zone 1. The two types
of concrete buildings and trees are the main areas in the two
zones.
In Table 6, Table 7, Table 8 and Table 9, the kinetic energy
of Zenith ATX8 at the impact point is the highest, which
could arrive at 13278.4 J. It is because the maximum takeoff
mass of Zenith ATX8 is the heavies. X8 flies the fastest of
the four and the maximum takeoff mass is 4.2 kg. In this
way, its impact energy is the second large but much larger

compared with Firebird and Typhoon H. Firebird has the
smallest energy at the impact point on the ground because
of the smallest maximum takeoff mass as well as slow moving
speed. The covered area on the ground of X8 is the biggest,
which is mainly determined by the dimensions of UAV itself
as analyzed in (3) and Typhoon H influences the smallest
area on the ground with only 2.63 m2 . The other two are in
the medium positions. In all rotary-wing UAVs would cover
much smaller areas on the ground compared with fixed-wing
UAVs.
When the UAV Firebird flies in Changqing Campus, Zone
6 is the most fatal with 𝑃𝑓 = 0.37 and Zone 3 is the safest
with the smallest 𝑃𝑓 = 0.11. The sheltering factors in the two
zones are so different that one is the lowest and the other is
the highest. The probability of failure in Zone 1 is the lowest,
which means the safety requirement on UAVs in this zone is
the highest. For Firebird, the safe operation time between two
consecutive accidents should arrive 1.72 × 107 hours at least.
The lowest value is 1.72 × 106 hours, which is in Zone 2. The
requirements in Zone 3, Zone 5, and Zone 6 are similar but
much higher than that in Zone 4.
Table 7 shows the simulation results for X8. When X8
flies, Zone 6 is the most fatal with the value 0.35. Oppositely,
Zone 3 is the safest only with 0.08. The highest failure
probability is in Zone 2 as high as 3.32 × 10−7 . In this way, the
required safe flying time would be 3.01 × 106 hours. If X8 flies
in Zone 1, its failure probability should be as low as 3.26×10 −8 ,
which means the time between two consecutive accidents
should be no less than 3.07 × 107 hours. But Zone 3, Zone
5, and Zone 6 are in the same order of magnitudes, which
is lower than Zone 4. Zone 3 is relatively safer compared
with the Zone 5 and Zone 6 when X8 operates in Changqing
Campus.
The similar results can be found for Typhoon H in all the
six zones. Zone 6 is still the most fatal and Zone 3 is safest of
the six. The probabilities of failure in Zone 1, Zone 3, Zone
5, and Zone 6 are in the same order of magnitudes. Zone 1
needs Typhoon H to fly safely without any malfunctions up
to 3.48×106 hours which is the longest time. Zone 2 and Zone
4 have the similar requirements with the order of magnitudes
105 , which is much lower than that in the other zones.
Table 9 gives the results for Zenith ATX8 in the six different zones. Zone 6 and Zone 4 are the two most dangerous
because of the low sheltering factors. Zone 1 and Zone 6
require ATX8 operate a long safe time without any malfunctions. Zone 2 and Zone 4 would tolerate poor performance of
ATX8, which need it fly safely up to 3.32 × 105 and 6.47 × 105
hours, respectively, which are much shorter compared with
other zones.
Based on Table 6, Table 7, Table 8 and Table 9, no matter
which kind of UAVs operate in the six zones, Zone 6 is
always the most fatal to the ground and Zone 3 is the safest
with the lowest fatality probability. UAVs will produce fewest
injuries on the ground in Zone 3. Every UAV should fly the
longest time without any failures in Zone 1, because the failure
probability in this zone is the lowest for all kinds of UAVs.
Zone 2 and Zone 4 are the two medium zones in Changqing
Campus, Shandong Jiaotong University.
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3. Midair Collision Fatality Risk Estimation
In this part an estimation model of midair collisions between
UAVs and other civil manned aircraft are proposed. Actual
civil flight data of taking off and landing in 2015 over Chinese
airspace are incorporated to develop the model. The expected
frequency of fatalities in the midair is used as an evaluation
standard.
3.1. Problem Description. In this paper the midair collision
risk estimation was based on the use of an existing general
gas model [32] of aircraft collisions to estimate the expected
frequency of fatalities per hour of flight. In the proposed
method a model of midair collisions between UAVs and
other aircraft was developed. In the model a UAV is equally
likely to be located anywhere in the airspace. Additionally,
its velocity is assumed to be small compared to the civil
aircraft. Once civil aircraft fly within the airspace, a potential
collision volume will be extruded. In this way the expected
level of safety in terms of potential collisions per hour of UAV
operation is then becoming the ratio of volume extruded by
threatened civil aircraft per hour to the volume of airspace.
The model incorporates domestic air traffic density data
in 2015 over Chinese airspace. UAVs are supposed to be
deployed randomly in a specified airspace. Once there are
threatened civil aircraft entering the space, the collision
volumes of UAVs will be extruded. The number of UAVs and
civil aircraft in the airspace determines the occupation rate of
the airspace. Relative collision area and speed between UAVs
and civil aircraft could generate effects on the final collision
frequency.
3.2. Model Analysis
(1) Expected Number of Fatalities after a Collision. The number
of people exposed to the midair accident as well as the
probability of them sustaining fatal injuries depends on the
aircraft that are involved in the accident and the passengers
they carry. In this way, it is difficult to get a good estimate
without a priori knowledge of all air traffic in the area of
operations. Based on the NTSB accident data from 1983 to
2006, the value of the expected number of fatalities after
a midair collision is closer to 0.58 [27]. Moreover, if the
onboard fatalities after a collision with obstacles other than
aircraft are ignored, the expected number of fatalities per
accident drops to below 0.09. It should be noted that this
estimate can be considered conservative because in contrast
with the accident data it was derived from, the midair
collisions of interest will always involve at least one aircraft
that is unoccupied. In this paper, the expected number of
fatalities after a collision is set as 0.58, which is widely
accepted in the existing research.
(2) Number of UAVs and Density of Civil Aircraft. In the
proposed model, for the midair collision problem all the
UAVs in the airspace are assumed to be uniformly distributed
from sea level to 50,000 ft to simplify the calculation of the
midair collision risk, in which elevation is neglected. The
number of UAVs in the airspace, NUAV , is a variable. Density
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of civil aircraft 𝜌AC reflects the number of aircraft per cubic
meter and per hour, which can be obtained using following
equation. A total year’s data of Chinese domestic civil flights
are used.
𝜌𝐴𝐶 =

𝑁𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑉𝑎𝑠 ⋅ 𝑁𝑑𝑎𝑦 ⋅ 𝑁ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟

(13)

In (13), Ntotal is the total number of domestic civil flights
taking off and landing over Chinese airspace in the whole year
of 2015. Nday and Nhour are the number of the days in a year
and number of hours in a day respectively. V as is the volume of
the specified airspace, which could be calculated by 50,000 ft
multiplying territory acreage.
(3) Collision Areas of UAVs and Manned Aircraft. In the
gas model of aircraft collisions [32], each civil aircraft will
fly a distance, dAC , through the airspace segment under
consideration. There is an area of exposure for threatened
civil aircraft A AC as well as for UAVs A UAV , which representing
the contact area that in a collision. The collision area is
important for the calculation of collision times. For the
preliminary analysis in the estimation model, the area of
exposure for civil aircraft AAC is estimated as the frontal area
of a Boeing 747, approximately 180 m2 . The area of exposure
for UAVs AUAV varies based on different kinds of UAVs.
Collison area could be calculated as follows:
𝑆𝐶 = 𝜋 (√

2

𝐴 𝐴𝐶
𝐴
+ √ 𝑈𝐴𝑉 )
𝜋
𝜋

(14)

(4) Relative Speed between UAVs and Civil Flights. Another
parameter is the relative speed between UAVs and civil flights.
It is used to calculate a potential collision volume combining
with collision areas given in
(14). Here we suppose that VUAV and VAC denote the
speeds of UAV and civil aircraft respectively. The relative
speed can be obtained as in
2 + 𝑉2
𝑉𝑅 = √𝑉𝐴𝐶
𝑈𝐴𝑉 − 2 ⋅ 𝑉𝐴𝐶 ⋅ 𝑉𝑈𝐴𝑉 ⋅ sin 𝛼

(15)

In (15) 𝛼 is the relative direction angle formed by UAVs
and civil aircraft, where 𝛼 = 2𝜋/𝑁𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 in the specified
airspace. Combining (14) and (15) the potential collision
volume can be further obtained by (16), in which T is the
relative time unit that UAVs and civil aircraft operate.
𝑉𝐶𝑂 = 𝑆𝐶 ⋅ 𝑉𝑅 ⋅ 𝑇

(16)

Combining with all the analysis above, the expected
number of collisions per hour of UAV flights in the NAS with
𝑅𝐶 = 𝑁𝑈𝐴𝑉 ⋅ 𝜌𝐴𝐶 ⋅

𝑉𝐶𝑂
𝑇

(17)

By using the equations above, (17) could be further
rewritten as follows for simplification:
𝑅𝐶 = 𝑁𝑈𝐴𝑉 ⋅ 𝜌𝐴𝐶 ⋅ 𝑆𝐶 ⋅ 𝑉𝑅

(18)
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Figure 9: Expected frequency of fatalities in China.

Finally based on analysis above, the midair collision risk
estimation model can be generated. The expected frequency
of fatalities per hour of UAV flights in the NAS can be
obtained with
𝑓𝐹 = 𝐸𝐹 ⋅ 𝑅𝐶

Table 10: Core parameters of UAVs.
Collision area
90 𝑚2

Speed
635 𝑘𝑚/ℎ

Number of UAVs
2𝑘, 4𝑘, 6k, 8k

(19)

In midair collision risk estimation, since severe uncertainty often occurs in uncertain and dynamic environments,
the related factors should be incorporated in the model in
order to reduce the influence of severe uncertainty. Based on
the existing works, it turns out that the model is often quite
sensitive to even minor errors in the transition probabilities.
As given in (19), based on the gas model and extruded collision volume the model proposed becomes less sensitive to
uncertainty and simulation results also proves the robustness.
Simulations over the whole Chinese airspace using real
data will be given in the next part.
3.3. Model Simulations
(1) Different Parameter Settings. In this part territory areas of
each province in China are used, which could be found on the
government official websites publicly. The airspace is limited
below 50,000 ft. In this way, the airspace volumes of provinces
in every Chinese province can be calculated. In order to
simulate the number of civil aircraft in the airspace of each
province in China, actual civil flight data of taking off and
landing in 2015 over Chinese domestic airspace is used, which
could be easily found out from CAAC website. Another in
the proposed model all the types of aircraft operating in the
airspace are supposed to be the same as Boeing 747, which
means its frontal area is exactly 180 m2 given in technical

manual from Boeing company. In the same way, the cruse
speed will also be the same as 900 km/h.
All the UAVs operating in the NAS are set as large UAVs.
The core parameters needed in the proposed model, such
as frontal exposer area, flying speed and their numbers, are
given in Table 10, which are all obtained from the manufacturer manuals. Once all the parameters are determined, the
collision risk can be accomplished by (19).
(2) Simulation Results. To develop a preliminary estimate of
midair collision risk, the variation of frequency of fatalities
spatially over China was investigated, assuming that the UAV
was equally likely to be located from sea level to 50,000 ft,
neglecting effects of elevation. The model of midair collisions
given by (19) was applied to all air traffic from sea level to
50,000 ft over China. The resulting expected level of safety
over several regions of the country is shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9 shows the expected frequency of fatalities in
all the Chinese provinces when different numbers of UAVs
operate in the airspace. The numbers of UAVs are set as 2000,
4000, 6000, and 8000, respectively.
There is no doubt that Shanghai and Beijing are the
two most dangerous in China no matter how many UAVs
are there in the airspace. When 8000 UAVs operate in the
airspace, the highest value could arrive at 5.98 × 10−4 in
Shanghai and 2.06 × 10−4 in Beijing. The former one is two
times higher than the latter one. If there are 2000 UAVs
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operating, the values will be 1.49 × 10−4 and 5.15 × 10−5 in
Shanghai and Beijing.
Tibet and Qinghai are the safest of all with the lowest
expected frequency of fatalities under all the situations. The
reason is that the density of civil flights in the airspace is low
over the whole year. Their expected frequency of fatalities are
9.85 × 10−9 and 1.77 × 10−8 respectively if 2000 UAVs exist
in the airspace. It is obvious the expected frequency in Tibet
and Shanghai with 2000 and 8000 UAVs are not in the same
order of magnitudes.
Tianjin, Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Henan,
Chongqing are seven provinces, which are much safer than
Shanghai and Beijing. But these seven provinces are still
dangerous compared with the other provinces, which are
determined by the density of manned aircraft in the airspace.
The expected fatal frequencies of the seven provinces are all
above 10−5 .
Neimenggu, Xinjiang, and Gansu are the three provinces
that are more dangerous than Tibet and Qinghai, but much
safer compared with the others under all kinds of UAVs settings. The safety levels of Heilongjiang, Jilin, Hebei, ShanxiT,
Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, Sichuan, Yunnan,
Guizhou, ShanxiX, and Ningxia are in the medium range.
Based on the analysis above, we could conclude that the
majority of the midair collision risk is concentrated over
metropolitan areas with major airports by approximately
an order of magnitude. The structure of air traffic in the
NAS is clear, with large collision risk along several welltraveled routes. The expected level of safety calculated by
using this method does not adequately capture the expected
level of safety in low density regions. Civil flight density, and
therefore collision risk, is expected to be highest on major
flight levels and within the airway boundaries, reflecting the
operation of the majority of air traffic along airways in the
NAS. The structure of operations on flight levels and along
airways is likely to create local regions of increased density
in dimensions, which is not analyzed by this method in this
paper.

4. Conclusions
This paper has introduced an effective approach for modelling and assessing the risks associated with UAVs integrated
into NAS. Both ground impact hazard and midair collision
fatality risk are estimated, in which threats to fatalities
generated by the two hazards are the focus. Based on system
reliability required to meet a target level of safety for different
UAVs, a ground impact assessment model is proposed. Both
fixed-wing and rotary-wing UAVs are considered under a real
scenario. In the model territory and population data, casualty
areas, and sheltering factors are all indispensable. Since the
fatal injuries yields the probability that an impact may cause
a fatality, a random number generation process using this
probability, is used to determine if the fatality happens or
not for each simulation. A model of aircraft collisions is
designed to estimate the midair collision fatality risk based
on density of civil flight in different regions over China. The
relative collision area and operating speed between UAVs and
manned aircraft are constructed to obtain expected frequency
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of fatalities for each province with official government data.
Experimental simulations are made to evaluate the ground
impacts and midair collisions when UAVs operate in the NAS.
The models in this paper provides a generic framework that
can be used to structure the development of safety cases for
any UAV operation.

Data Availability
The datasets generated during and/or analyzed during the
current study are available from the corresponding author on
reasonable request.

Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest.

Acknowledgments
This work was supported by the National Natural Science
Foundation of China [Grants nos. U1433203, U1533119, and
L142200032] and the Foundation for Innovative Research
Groups of the National Natural Science Foundation of China
[Grant no. 61221061].

References
[1] O. Alvear, N. R. Zema, E. Natalizio, and C. T. Calafate, “Using
UAV-based systems to monitor air pollution in areas with poor
accessibility,” Journal of Advanced Transportation, vol. 2017, 14
pages, 2017.
[2] O. Doukhi, A. R. Fayjie, and D. J. Lee, “Intelligent Controller
Design for Quad-Rotor Stabilization in Presence of Parameter
Variations,” Journal of Advanced Transportation, vol. 2017, Article ID 4683912, 10 pages, 2017.
[3] A. Babaie and J. Karimi, “Optimal trajectory planning for a UAV
in presence of terrain and threats,” Aerospace Mechanics Journal,
vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 57–69, 2011.
[4] X. Zhang and H. Duan, “An improved constrained differential
evolution algorithm for unmanned aerial vehicle global route
planning,” Applied Soft Computing, vol. 26, pp. 270–284, 2015.
[5] V. Roberge, M. Tarbouchi, and G. Labonte, “Comparison of
parallel genetic algorithm and particle swarm optimization for
real-time UAV path planning,” IEEE Transactions on Industrial
Informatics, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 132–141, 2013.
[6] Y. Liu, X. Zhang, X. Guan, and D. Delahaye, “Potential Odor
Intensity Grid Based UAV Path Planning Algorithm with Particle Swarm Optimization Approach,” Mathematical Problems in
Engineering, vol. 2016, Article ID 7802798, 16 pages, 2016.
[7] Y. G. Fu, M. Y. Ding, and C. P. Zhou, “Phase angle-encoded
and quantum-behaved particle swarm optimization applied to
three-dimensional route planning for UAV,” IEEE Transactions
on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems, vol. 42, no. 2, pp.
511–526, 2012.
[8] J. Karimi and S. H. Pourtakdoust, “Optimal maneuver-based
motion planning over terrain and threats using a dynamic
hybrid PSO algorithm,” Aerospace Science and Technology, vol.
26, no. 1, pp. 60–71, 2013.
[9] P. Kazarin, A. Provalov, V. Golubev et al., “Terminal-zone Wake
Vortex Safety Assessment in the Context of UAS Integration in

Journal of Advanced Transportation

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

[16]
[17]

[18]
[19]

[20]

[21]

[22]

[23]

[24]

[25]

the NAS,” Transportation Research Procedia, vol. 14, pp. 1364–
1373, 2016.
R. A. Clothier and R. A. Walker, “Safety risk management of
unmanned aircraft systems,” Handbook of Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles, pp. 2229–2275, 2015.
H.-T. Lee, L. A. Meyn, and S. Kim, “Probabilistic safety assessment of unmanned aerial system operations,” Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 610–616, 2013.
J. Roberts, D. Frousheger, B. Williams, D. Campbell, and R.
Walker, “How the Outback Challenge Was Won: The Motivation for the UAV Challenge Outback Rescue, the Competition
Mission, and a Summary of the Six Events,” IEEE Robotics &
Automation Magazine, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 54–62, 2016.
E. Mueller, “Operational Profiles of Unmanned Aircraft Systems
in the Context of the US Regulatory Regime,” Encyclopedia of
Aerospace Engineering, 2016.
K. D. Davis, “Interim operation approval guidance 08-01:
Unmanned aircraft systems operations in the US National
Airspace System,” FAA Unmanned Aircraft Systems Program
Office, 2008.
Y. Liu, X. Zhang, X. Guan, and D. Delahaye, “Adaptive sensitivity decision based path planning algorithm for unmanned aerial
vehicle with improved particle swarm optimization,” Aerospace
Science and Technology, vol. 58, pp. 92–102, 2016.
J. N. Anno, “Estimate of human control over mid-air collisions,”
Journal of Aircraft, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 86–88, 1982.
T. McGeer, L. Newcome, and J. Vagners, “Quantitative risk management as a regulatory approach to civil UAVs,” in Proceedings
of the International Workshop on UAV Certification, 1999.
T. McGeer, Aerosonde hazard estimation, The Insitu Group,
1994.
C. W. Lum and B. Waggoner, A risk based paradigm and model
for unmanned aerial vehicles in the national airspace, Infotech@
Aerospace, 2011.
C. W. Lum, K. Gauksheim, T. Kosel, and T. McGeer, “Assessing
and estimating risk of operating unmanned aerial systems
in populated areas,” in Proceedings of the 11th AIAA Aviation
Technology, Integration, and Operations (ATIO) Conference,
including the AIAA Balloon Systems Conference and 19th AIAA
Lighter-Than-Air Technology Conference 2011, USA, September
2011.
R. E. Weibel and R. J. Hansman Jr., “Safety considerations for
operation of different classes of UAVs in the NAS,” in Proceedings of the Collection of Technical Papers - AIAA 4th Aviation
Technology, Integration, and Operations Forum, ATIO, pp. 180–
190, USA, September 2004.
R. Weibel, M. Edwards, and C. Fernandes, “Establishing a
Risk-Based Separation Standard for Unmanned Aircraft Self
Separation,” in Proceedings of the 11th AIAA Aviation Technology,
Integration, and Operations (ATIO) Conference, Virginia Beach,
Va, USA, 2011.
M. J. Kochenderfer, M. W. M. Edwards, L. P. Espindle, J. K.
Kuchar, and J. D. Griffith, “Airspace encounter models for
estimating collision risk,” Journal of Guidance, Control, and
Dynamics, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 487–499, 2010.
T. B. Sheridan, “Rating Severity of Aircraft Separation Violations from Logic of Relative Collision Probability in Event
Reenactment,” Air Traffic Control Quarterly, vol. 18, no. 3, pp.
213–227, 2010.
A. J. Stolzer, Safety Management Systems in Aviation, Routledge,
2017.

11
[26] Federal Aviation Administration, System Safety Handbook:
Practices and Guidelines for Conducting System Safety Engineering and Management, 2000.
[27] K. Dalamagkidis, K. P. Valavanis, and L. A. Piegl, On Integrating
Unmanned Aircraft Systems into the National Airspace System:
Issues, Challenges, Operational Restrictions, Certification, and
Recommendations, Springer Science & Business Media, 2011.
[28] Federal Aviation Administration, “Expected Casualty Calculations for Commercial Space Launch and Reentry Missions,”
March 2013.
[29] Range Safety Group, “Range Commanders Council (2007)
Common risk criteria standards for national test ranges: Supplement,” Supplement to document 321-07, 2007.
[30] G. Guglieri and G. Ristorto, “Safety assessment for light remotely piloted aircraft systems,” 1-7, 2016.
[31] G. Guglieri, F. Quagliotti, and G. Ristorto, “Operational issues
and assessment of risk for light UAVs,” Journal of Unmanned
Vehicle Systems, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 119–129, 2014.
[32] S. Endoh, Aircraft Collision Models, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, Flight Transportation Laboratory, Cambridge,
Mass, USA, 1982.

International Journal of

Advances in

Rotating
Machinery

Engineering
Journal of

Hindawi
www.hindawi.com

Volume 2018

The Scientific
World Journal
Hindawi Publishing Corporation
http://www.hindawi.com
www.hindawi.com

Volume 2018
2013

Multimedia

Journal of

Sensors
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com

Volume 2018

Hindawi
www.hindawi.com

Volume 2018

Hindawi
www.hindawi.com

Volume 2018

Journal of

Control Science
and Engineering

Advances in

Civil Engineering
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com

Hindawi
www.hindawi.com

Volume 2018

Volume 2018

Submit your manuscripts at
www.hindawi.com
Journal of

Journal of

Electrical and Computer
Engineering

Robotics
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com

Hindawi
www.hindawi.com

Volume 2018

Volume 2018

VLSI Design
Advances in
OptoElectronics
International Journal of

Navigation and
Observation
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com

Volume 2018

Hindawi
www.hindawi.com

Hindawi
www.hindawi.com

Chemical Engineering
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com

Volume 2018

Volume 2018

Active and Passive
Electronic Components

Antennas and
Propagation
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com

Aerospace
Engineering

Hindawi
www.hindawi.com

Volume 2018

Hindawi
www.hindawi.com

Volume 2018

Volume 2018

International Journal of

International Journal of

International Journal of

Modelling &
Simulation
in Engineering

Volume 2018

Hindawi
www.hindawi.com

Volume 2018

Shock and Vibration
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com

Volume 2018

Advances in

Acoustics and Vibration
Hindawi
www.hindawi.com

Volume 2018

